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1. Introduction
How effective are co-operatives at surviving economic recession? Can they grow at the expense of 
investor-owned businesses? Do they provide an alternative business model for the future, one that is more 
sustainable and less risky? These are important questions, particularly in this recession in relation to the 
banking crisis, but also more generally in relation to the way we do business. The easiest way to begin to 
answer them is with historical evidence from previous recessions. 
There is quite a lot of evidence that co-ops survive crises better than other types of business. The history 
of the british consumer co-operatives in the 19th century is one of continued growth only marginally 
checked by recessions (birchall 1994). similarly, the raiffeisen banks in germany and austria experienced 
continuous and almost trouble-free growth during the period from the 1860s to the First World War. 
Their urban counterparts, the volksbanks, were less reliable, sometimes failing during recessions but due 
(and this is a startlingly contemporary point) to their having incentivized their managers to make unsound 
loans (Wolff 1910). similarly, in the 1930s consumer co-ops in europe experienced increased customer 
loyalty, less intense competition and so (except where they fell under fascist rule) continued to expand. 
Farmer co-ops also experienced greater loyalty, and increased government support, particularly in the usa 
and the scandinavian countries, and new utility co-ops provided electricity and telephones to rural usa 
(birchall 1997). During the radical economic restructuring of the 1970s, worker co-ops in europe grew 
in numbers and demonstrated a lower failure rate than conventional firms (oakeshott 1978). During the 
recent banking crisis, co-operative banks, credit unions (and in the uK building societies) began to be 
seen as a steady, less risky alternative to the big corporate banks, a safe haven for savings. They experienced 
comparatively minor losses, except where investments went bad (us Credit union Central, norinchukin 
bank, Dunfermline building society), and apart from the $1bn made available by the us government to 
two credit union centrals, they did not need bailing out. on all the indicators, their business gained at the 
expense of investor-owned banks (birchall and Hammond Ketilson 2009). 
However, the problem with historical analysis is that there are always counter-examples. In the period 
1828-32 a severe recession wiped out a new co-operative movement in britain and Ireland, including 
the first attempt at shop keeping by the rochdale Pioneers. Worker co-operative movements that grew 
rapidly in the usa and uK during the 1880s died out quickly in the recession of the 1890s. Housing 
co-operatives in new York that had been very successful during the 1920s went bankrupt after the crash 
of 1930. We should not be surprised that history is so complicated. The subject needs careful analysis 
before any generalisations can be made. recessions are not all of the same type. First, they vary in degree 
of severity. In some cases, the poverty of co-op members is so deep that it is not possible to trade one’s way 
out. The co-operative movement of the 1920s that spread rapidly round britain and Ireland died out in the 
early 1830s, it is said because societies gave credit (Cole 1944). However, it is likely that this is a symptom 
of a deeper problem; desperate poverty among their members. The societies that faced recession in the 
1870s survived because their members had built up savings out of their ‘dividend’ that could see them 
through the hard times (Holyoake 1907). second, recessions vary in their causes and so in their effects 
on different types of co-operative. In the 1930s consumer co-operatives were promoted in the usa as an 
answer to a recession caused by under-consumption, while in the current recession we face the opposite 
problem of consumer indebtedness and it is co-operative banks that are getting attention. 
What we can say for certain is that co-operatives are businesses that have to compete with other 
businesses for survival. a recession searches out weaknesses, in management, in business strategy, in the 
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quality of services provided, in the cost structure of the business, and so on. at the level of individual 
businesses, much of the explanation for their survival or disappearance is similar no matter what the 
ownership type. Case studies of failed member-owned businesses (Mobs) look quite similar to case studies 
of failed investor-owned businesses (Iobs). In contrast, if we shift our attention upwards to whole sectors, 
we find that different ownership types do have different survival and growth rates that must be partly 
attributable to the advantages and disadvantages of the way ownership is structured. 
Hansmann gives the simplest and most powerful explanation in his book The ownership of enterprise, 
in which he shows that the costs of ownership and the costs of market contracting are crucial to survival 
(1996). The co-operative business model survives when the costs of market contracting between the firm 
and its patrons are too high and it pays to bring one of the patrons into membership. If the costs of 
ownership are too high, though, this will make the co-operative ownership option less efficient than the 
investor-owned option. Hansmann defines costs broadly as ‘all interests and values that might be affected 
by transactions between a firm and its patrons’, and he makes it clear that the valuation is both subjective 
and objective (p23). Here, I want to keep this broad definition of costs, but to extend the analysis to 
include benefits. This is in keeping with Hansmann’s intention. His question is ‘What is the lowest-cost 
assignment of ownership’, and he means by this ‘the assignment of ownership that minimizes the total 
costs of transactions between the firm and all of its patrons’. However, he also suggests an alternative, ‘the 
assignment of ownership that maximizes the total net benefits’ (p21). 
My approach is along these lines but the analysis is broader and takes in other factors; I tend to theorise 
advantages and disadvantages rather than costs and benefits. I also want to take an even broader approach 
and point out the advantages of co-operatives not just to their existing members but to potential members, 
to the economic sector they are in, and to the wider society in which the economy is embedded. This is 
important for public policy. 
2. Recession and the co-operative alternative
In the last two decades there has been a relentless drive towards regionalization of markets that co-
operatives have found it difficult to keep up with. Farmer co-ops have devised several methods for raising 
capital, ranging from conversion to mixed ownership to joint ventures, and new types of co-operative 
that require producers to capitalize the business in proportion to delivery rights (Chaddad and Cook 
2004). This has enabled them to compete with transnational food processing companies but it has strained 
co-operative principles and led to a distancing of members from governance. Large, national-level co-
operative banks and consumer co-ops have felt the need to establish a presence in other countries, but it has 
not been very profitable and some had begun to draw back even before the recession hit. The recession may 
provide a breathing space that will allow for reflection and renewed commitment to principle. The problem 
of capital raising is not so bad, as there is less need to keep up with the competition in new developments. 
The temptation to convert or sell the business is less, as it is not worth so much! Managers value their job 
security and are more easily incentivised to do a good job. Members may become more interested as the 
mood switches from individualism to a sense of collective interest. Member loyalty increases as there fewer 
alternatives and the rewards from membership become more valuable. Members therefore have more of 
an interest in making sure the business is governed well. Worker co-operatives, in particular, are able to 
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demonstrate their advantages by laying off fewer workers than their competitors, finding ways to protect 
jobs and working conditions despite the recession (Craig and Pencavel 1992, 1994; bonin, Jones and 
Putterman 1993; burdin and Dean 2009). 
on the other hand, while there is less pressure to behave like an investor-owned business in the drive 
to expand and dominate markets, there is relentless pressure to cut costs, to stay efficient and to give 
value to members so as to ensure loyalty. There is less demand for products and services and so worker-
owned enterprises may struggle. In fact it is difficult to predict the effects of a prolonged recession on co-
operatives; the effect may vary by type, and by market context.  
Within the wider debate about the causes and consequences of the recession, co-operatives have the 
potential to become a very popular option. There is a growing consensus that there is a need for a new 
economic world order that provides greater stability and less risk-taking, particularly in banking (Cable 
2009). businesses need to develop a more long-term outlook that works against a ‘get rich quick’ mentality 
in investors and managers, that ensures greater equity in the share that ordinary citizens get from the 
economic results (fair shares), that in its results provides a bias towards the poor, and produces sustainable 
economic growth without ruining the planet. In this search for a new economic order, the potential of 
co-operatives is beginning to be recognised. Policy-makers are discovering (once again) that co-operatives 
have the potential to help limit the damage done to ordinary people by economic recession and to aid the 
recovery. We can expect governments to sponsor job creation through worker co-ops, new types of public 
service co-ops, support for farmers, and so on. but do co-operatives have the potential to be more than 
a palliative (treating the symptoms not the underlying condition)? Can they provide a new way of doing 
business that avoids the excessive greed, risk-taking, and short-termism of investor owned businesses, 
particularly in banking?
to answer these questions we need to consider the comparative nature of business advantage. The 
advantages of one type of ownership depend on the relative advantages and disadvantages of other types. It 
was thought until very recently that investor-ownership had all the advantages. now we are being forced to 
rethink that assumption. Investor-ownership is seen to be unstable and risky. Its managers are seen as being 
out of control by investors, and demanding more and more incentives just to do their job. government 
regulation is seen as being ineffective in preventing managerial greed and corruption. In financial services 
in particular, the arguments for member-owned businesses (co-operative banks, credit unions, building 
societies) are attracting wide interest. 
to find out what the potential of co-operatives might be in this new world order we have to understand 
them better. I suggest we classify them as ‘member-owned businesses’ (Mobs); co-operatives are part of 
a larger class of member-owned businesses that are already a serious alternative to capitalism (birchall 
2010, ch.1). once we understand their ownership structure we can predict their comparative advantages 
and disadvantages. In particular we can begin to understand why, in some ways, they seem to be stronger 
during economic recessions. 
3. A member-owned business approach
business organisations can be divided into different types according to their ownership structure, which 
then has significant consequences for the way they are governed and who benefits from their activities. 
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Many people, when they think of how businesses are owned, assume that there is only one type that is 
worth considering; the investor-owned business (shortened from here on to Iob). It is a simple concept; 
entrepreneurs start up an enterprise, people with money to invest buy a proportionate share in ownership, 
and they elect a board of directors to oversee the company on their behalf and hire professional managers 
to run it. such a business is argued to be uniquely efficient and effective, because its governance is simple; 
owners all want the same thing - their return on capital in the form of share value and dividends – and 
boards and managers are given a clear mandate to do whatever it takes to deliver ‘shareholder value’. It is 
usually contrasted with the public sector business (Pob) that is owned by citizens in general and governed by 
elected politicians, and that, while being indispensable for creating a ‘public interest’ and delivering some 
public goods, may be better at regulating than competing in markets. 
There are several other ways of doing business. The simplest form is individual self-employment, which 
combines ownership, governance and management in one person. This is limited in what it can achieve, 
and it leads naturally to people wanting to work together in partnership; this enables a group of people 
to gain the advantages of joint ownership and collective management, and is particularly useful for 
professionals such as architects, lawyers and accountants. governance is straightforward because they share 
the same values and practice similar skills, and their contribution to the firm can easily be measured. a 
family business is a special kind of partnership that restricts ownership and management to one’s kin, and 
because the owners are related and tend to have high levels of loyalty and trust, its governance is simple 
and has proved to be a popular and enduring type of business organisation. a philanthropic organisation 
is more complex, being designed for one group of people to meet the needs of a different group. It is not 
really owned by anyone, because trustees are appointed who look after the business on behalf of these two 
distinct groups of givers and receivers (Hansmann 1996).
 a member-owned business is another distinct type (from here on shortened to Mob). Here, people 
become members of an economic association through which they choose to meet their needs directly, 
through provision of food, housing, banking, insurance, medical care, water supplies for irrigation, secure 
employment or any other goods or services they want to provide for themselves. such associations are 
usually called co-operatives or mutuals, though they can have other names such as farmer association, 
friendly society, employee-owned business or credit union. If they are small, they can be governed like 
partnerships, but if they grow larger they become more complex. ownership then tends to be dispersed 
among large numbers of people whose interests may be heterogeneous, and who rely on an elected board to 
deliver value to them not as shareholders but as users.  of course, as Hansmann points out, investors could 
also be seen as members and the business that they own could also be seen as a type of co-operative (1996); 
it all depends how far one wants to stretch these terms. However, he recognises a fundamental distinction 
between owners whose main purpose is to benefit from their investment though dividends and increased 
share prices, and those whose main purpose is to provide goods or services they need as users. In the latter 
case, member shares are not usually sold at market value and dividends can be seen as ‘patronage refunds’ 
rather than profits.1 also, user-members tend to allocate voting rights by person or by amount of use made 
of the business, rather than by level of investment. The idea of membership has become an established 
way of distinguishing between Mobs and other ownership types, and is the way in which almost all co-
operatives and mutuals refer to their owners (birchall 2010, ch.10). 
1 The patronage refund (known in the uK as the co-op dividend or divi) can be seen as a return to the members of an overpayment 
since they are providing goods to themselves at cost-price plus expenses, but for convenience are initially pricing their products 
at around market prices.
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Here is a simple classification (see table 1). apart from the investors of capital, there are two main 
stakeholders in a business: its consumers and the producers who supply inputs to or take the outputs 
from the business. 2 In an Mob, usually one of these stakeholders is put at the centre of the business. 
This gives us two classes: consumer-owned and producer-owned businesses.3 It is not quite that simple. 
There are some complications. First, though most Mobs are ‘single-stakeholder’ in nature, the people 
who join them can have more than one identity, being at the same time producers as well as consumers, or 
employees as well as customers. Farmers are both producers and individually consumers, and so agricultural 
supply co-operatives often provide them with consumer goods as well as farm inputs. some of the people 
who need banking services have their own businesses, and so have both business and personal accounts. 
second, in some Mobs more than one type of person can join. Insurance mutuals that set out to insure 
farmers often extend into general assurance for householders. Credit unions often have in membership 
individual customers and small businesses. building societies often have two categories of member; savers 
and borrowers. Third, a few Mobs are multi-stakeholding. They deliberately offer different categories 
of membership to more than one stakeholder. The eroski retail co-operative in spain has employee and 
customer members, while the ICoop group in Korea has consumer and producer (farmer) members. The 
social co-operatives in Italy that provide care services to disabled and vulnerable people are, by law, required 
to offer membership to employees, service users and carers. However, multi-stakeholder obs are quite 
rare; probably because in taking such different interest groups into membership they increase the costs of 
governance (see Hansmann 1996). 
What does it mean to be the owner of a business? There are three aspects: ownership, control and benefit 
(birchall, Mayo and simon 2011). ownership rights mean at their most basic that one has power to decide 
if a business continues to exist, is sold off or wound up. This is why, even when members do not have any 
control over a business it cannot be sold without their permission. In the case of uK building societies, 
boards and managers had to campaign among members to get them to vote in favour, even though the 
members had never before been consulted and many were unaware that they were members (birchall, ed. 
2001).  ownership usually gives control rights, even if these are attenuated by rules and practices that 
allow boards to operate with very little input from members. at the minimum, members have the right 
to vote on new appointments to the board and to approve annual accounts. They can organise to censure 
or remove boards that they feel are failing to serve their interests. ownership also confers a right to share 
in the benefits accruing from the business and also to have a say in how these benefits are allocated.  a 
straightforward definition of an Mob follows: it is a business organisation that is owned and controlled by 
members who are drawn from one (or more) of two types of stakeholder – consumers and producers - and whose 
benefits go mainly to these members (Birchall 2010: 4).   
We can use this classification to list the different types of Mob in the same way that scientists identify 
individual genera within a class, and species within a genus (see table 1). We can then identify hybrids that 
have mixed ownership but with some of the characteristics of an Mob. 
2 Hansmann’s classification is slightly different (1996). He separates the inputs to producer-owned businesses from the outputs, 
calling the first consumer-owned and the second producer-owned. However, in practice supply and marketing are often done 
by the same agricultural co-operative or retailer-owned wholesaler. also, I prefer to make the distinction firmer between end-
consumers and producers who also consume (in order to produce).
3 In a previous formulation a three-fold typology was used, including also employee-owned businesses. These are essentially 
partnerships in which people provide paid work for themselves either as self-employed or employed workers. The distinction 
is really one of how members choose to allocate the value added. Pragmatically, some types of production technology are more 
suited to one than the other. 
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table 1: a suggested taxonomy of member-owned businesses
Class Genus Species Hybrids
Consumer owned General retailing  Consumer co-ops: food, staple goods 
Jointly owned business with other 
retailers
Consumer owned
Specialist retailing     Consumer co-ops: pharmacy, funerals, 
travel, garage services, etc.
Joint ventures
Consumer owned 
Insurance         Friendly societies, mutual assurance, life 
insurance, health insurance
Consumer owned Housing
Market value, limited equity and non-equity 
housing co-ops
Community housing associations 
(Scotland)
Consumer owned
Utilities                  
Electricity, water, telecoms co-ops Joint ventures with local government
Consumer owned Education
Child care co-ops, co-operative schools 
(Sweden)
Schools with multi-stakeholder 
governance, foundation health trusts 
(England) 
Consumer and 
producer owned
Banking  
Co-operative banks, credit unions, savings 
and credit co-ops
Mutual savings banks (USA)
Producer owned Primary producer coop
Farming, fishery, forestry (supply, marketing 
and/or processing)
Several hybrids introducing investor 
owners
Producer owned
Retailer-owned  
wholesaler
Supermarkets, hardware stores, pharmacy Jointly owned business with wholesalers
Producer owned
Shared services for self-
employed, small business 
& professionals
A wide variety, including taxi drivers, 
artisans, market traders, dentists co-
operatives
Minority producer-ownership in an IOB
Producer owned
Worker co-ops on a 
continuum: simple labour 
co-op to co-op group
A wide variety of sectors Employee share-ownership schemes
4. Advantages of MOBs to their members
We now turn to a more formal analysis of advantages based on the inherent characteristics of member 
ownership, and look to understand these better with evidence from historical accounts of the development 
of Mob sectors (see birchall 2011). The advantages held by Mobs derive directly from the three features 
of ownership, control and benefit. We can distinguish general advantages that apply to all Mobs, which 
can then be refined by class of Mob (see table 2) and refined even further by species (see table 3). There 
are also disadvantages that can be linked to the same three features, and there are also, in some cases, other 
ways of gaining the advantages through action by other types of owner, notably the public sector. 
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table 2: advantages of member-owned businesses by class
Derived from ownership Derived from control Derived from benefits
Consumer OBs
Prevents cartels or monopolies 
that damage consumer interests. 
Enables trust in long term 
relationships under uncertain 
contracts.
Focuses the business on what 
matters to consumer members. 
Enables ethical choices to be 
made. Manages risk effectively. 
Patronage refund acts as a ‘cost 
price’ mechanism providing 
consumers with goods at lowest 
possible cost.
Producer OBs
As above in relation to producer 
interests.
As above in relation to producer 
members.
As above in relation to supply, 
and with second payment for 
goods marketed adjusting to cost 
of providing the service.  
Employee OBs (as a subset 
of producer OBs)
Prevents employers from exploiting 
workers when labour is in a weak 
bargaining position.
Prevents asset stripping, hostile 
takeovers. Provides choice over 
working conditions, prevents 
redundancy.
Enables workers to capture all the 
net added value from their labour.
table 3: some advantages of different species of member-owned business
CLASS Species of MOB Advantages to members Wider advantages
Consumer owned General retailing  
Pure food, opportunity for fair trade, local 
food sourcing, dividend on purchases, 
consumer voice.
Community engagement, social role, 
campaigning, ensuring competition and 
local presence.
Consumer owned Specialist retailing     As above but varying between sectors. As above.
Consumer owned Insurance         
Long term trust, especially in pensions. 
Low cost. Reliability, ability to insure the 
less insurable. 
Ensuring competition, preventing cream 
skimming.
Consumer owned Housing
Equity co-ops enable control over multi-
occupied blocks, while non-equity co-ops 
enable tenant control over social housing.
Spillover effects into the wider 
environment. Demonstration effects for 
social housing tenants. Prevention of 
homelessness.
Consumer owned Utilities                  
Spread of utilities to rural areas that IOBs 
are not interested in. Consumer monopoly 
ensures low prices. 
Prevention of monopolies by IOBs. Can 
be more efficient than POBs. Health and 
educational benefits.
Consumer owned Education Responsiveness to parents’ preferences. Higher educational attainment.
Consumer and 
producer owned
Banking  
Availability of credit for business 
development. Safe haven for savings. 
Avoidance of loan sharks. 
Low risk banks that can stabilise the 
wider banking system. Credit available to 
develop local economy. 
Producer owned
Primary producer co-
operative: farming, fishing, 
forestry
Raising of incomes of primary producers 
through: lower price and better quality of 
inputs; effective marketing of produce; 
processing to add value. 
Delivery of farm extension services, 
strengthening of rural economies, 
increase in income impacting on 
education, child and maternal health. 
Producer owned Retailer-owned  wholesaler
Ability to provide competitive advantage 
against multiple chains. Provides access to 
poorer, less mobile consumers.
Ensures competition among different 
types of provider, preventing cartels/
monopoly. Stabilises local economies. 
Producer owned
Shared services for self-
employed, small business 
& professionals
Provision of at-cost services to businesses 
that give a competitive advantage, and 
ability to grow.
Helps local economies to grow, provides 
employment.
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4.1. Advantages derived from ownership
In general, ownership of the means by which a good or service is produced prevents ownership by a 
different interest group that might exploit the economic weakness of individual members (Hansmann 
1996). another way of putting this is that without the Mob existing there would be market failure. From 
the point of view of consumers, small producers and partners, there are four kinds of failure that matter:
1. a monopoly in which one supplier dominates, or an oligopoly (cartel) in which several suppliers 
collude
2. a monopsony in which one buyer dominates, or a buyers’ oligopoly in which several buyers collude
3. a situation in which there may be many suppliers or buyers but each can lock purchasers or sellers in 
through supplying credit 
4. a lack of markets which means the goods are not supplied
Consumer co-operatives have often broken up monopolies and cartels among their competitors. For 
instance, in the late 19th century in the uK, the 1920s in scandinavia, and the 1960s and 1970s in Japan, 
consumer co-operatives set new quality and safety standards for goods, forcing competitors to follow suit 
(birchall 1997). In the 1920s swedish and british co-operative wholesalers joined forces to produce light 
bulbs and radios against monopoly suppliers, thus forcing down the price (birchall 1994: 126-8). as 
buyers they have acted against monopsony through creating new buying chains such as those for fair trade 
coffee and cotton, while uK consumer co-ops have begun a policy of buying from local producers. They 
have prevented a less obvious kind of monopoly by saving their members from falling into the power of 
competitors through debt. retail co-operatives in britain in the 19th century provided an alternative to 
local grocers who charged high prices for adulterated goods because their customers became indebted to 
them (birchall 1994: 66-9). Credit unions and co-operative banks are very good at preventing loan sharks 
from charging high interest rates that impoverish people on low incomes (birchall 2013a). sometimes 
retailers and banks are uninterested in ensuring that essential supplies are distributed in less profitable areas 
such as sparsely populated rural areas and villages that will only sustain a small store. Here, retail consumer 
co-ops and credit unions have stepped in because their member-owners are willing to put service before 
the maximising of profit. For instance, since the 1990s, while banks have reduced their costs by closing 
branches, co-operative banks in continental europe and building societies in the uK have resisted the 
trend (birchall and Hammond Ketilson 2009). similarly, retail co-ops in sweden and scotland have kept 
open loss-making stores in villages (birchall 2009), while in several asian countries (notably sri Lanka, 
Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia) consumer co-ops have continued to supply rural areas even though this 
means they are not very profitable (birchall 1997: ch.5). 
Producer obs have also broken up cartels among suppliers of essential goods. For instance, in the 
1930s scandinavian farm supply co-ops prevented a monopoly in fertiliser by importing and processing 
it themselves (Fay 1938). More generally, they have guaranteed the quality of inputs such as seeds and 
livestock through taking a long-term view that is difficult to find in Iobs. However, it is in processing 
and marketing of primary products that they have shown their greatest advantage. Farmers and fishers 
are vulnerable to exploitation by buyer monopolies and oligopolies at the point of sale. The particular 
vulnerability varies by the characteristics of the product. Dairy farmers need to sell milk daily and so 
need an effective distribution system that gets their product to markets in urban areas and an effective 
processing system that turns excess milk into dairy products with a longer shelf life. not surprisingly, 
in many countries dairy co-operatives have been outstandingly successful; they have even succeeded in 
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India and bangladesh where other types of Mob have not been so successful (birchall 1997: ch.5). grain 
farmers need to sell a less perishable commodity but are subject to bottlenecks in distribution systems; in 
order to prevent monopoly, in the late 19th century Canadian wheat farmers set up their own distribution 
co-ops with storage elevators giving access to the railway system. Cattle and pig farmers have a need for 
processing to add value to a product that is otherwise subject to gluts and price fluctuations and so it is not 
surprising that some of the largest international meat processing companies are owned by swedish, Danish 
and Finnish farmers (birchall 2009). as well as primary producers, other types of producer ob have been 
set up to counter the threat of unfair trade. notable are the strong retailer-obs in grocery and hardware in 
the usa among retailers facing fierce price competition from Walmart (birchall 2010: 165-6). 
Primary producers are also subject to buyer monopoly through the supply of credit. Farmers have a need 
for credit that fluctuates around the annual production cycle. suppliers and buyers are willing to provide 
this but it can lock in the producers to a vicious cycle of lower prices and increasing debt that can result in 
a situation of almost bonded labour. Producer obs cut through this cycle by providing their members with 
credit, either directly or through separate credit co-operatives. Producer obs have often been set up to help 
create the market they are entering into. In the 1890s in Denmark, farmers were beginning to export dairy 
products and pork, and they chose to do it through farmer co-ops rather than allow the investor-owned 
sector to dominate. They got in early enough to see off the competition and created a near-monopoly 
in export-led processing and marketing through their own businesses. a similar situation arose in new 
Zealand with dairying and sheep, and in the West coast of the usa with fruit farming. Co-operative 
banks in europe, followed by credit unions worldwide, have provided small businesses with the credit they 
need when commercial banks were unwilling to lend at all. Financial deepening in the less economically 
developed countries depends heavily on Mobs becoming established, since the costs to conventional 
banks of serving the poor make this sector unprofitable (World bank 2009). 
Worker obs have not addressed such market failures directly. Most come about as a result of employees 
taking up share options and gradually buying out their employers, or as a result of employers wanting 
to retire and sell the business to their employees. The change of ownership does not lead to a change in 
market position and so any market imperfections that exist will remain. However, some worker obs are 
from a ‘worker co-operative’ tradition in which workers set up their own businesses in order to provide 
alternative employment. They counter the weakness of labour in relation to the buyers of labour by hiring 
themselves. sometimes, as in the Mondragon system in spain, their motivation is to provide jobs where the 
labour market has not provided them. sometimes, as in recent takeovers of businesses in argentina, their 
motivation is to save jobs where a wider market failure has occurred (Howarth 2007). It is a difficult task 
to get right, since the workers inherit a firm that for one reason or another has proved unviable. another 
advantage sought is in job creation. In Finland, during a severe recession experienced in the 1990s, labour 
co-operatives were heavily promoted as a way of getting the unemployed back into paid work (birchall 
2003: 48-51).
These ‘cartel-busting’ capabilities of Mobs are likely to be even more important at a time of recession 
when Iobs are intensifying their attempts to dominate markets and maintain their profits. However, the 
advantages that Mobs have in relation to market failure are diminished if governments take action to 
regulate the market. Consumer protection legislation in developed countries has removed much of the 
rationale for consumer co-operatives. Contrast the uK, where in the 1960s the once powerful consumer 
co-operatives took no part in the setting up of a consumer movement, with Japan, where they were at the 
forefront of campaigns for food safety and environmental protection (Kurimoto 2010). Mutual insurance 
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is another example; in the usa in the 1890s this type expanded rapidly because government failed to 
regulate the industry and mutuals were felt to be safer than Iobs (birchall 2010: 79-80). The advantages 
of Mobs will also not be realised if governments decide to do the job themselves; contrast scotland in 
the 1930s where a marketing co-operative failed and government set up a statutory marketing board, with 
Finland where marketing co-operatives were preferred, leading to the development of a powerful farmer-
owned sector (birchall 2009). on the other hand, as well as market failure there is also government failure, 
and moves to privatise public bodies have sometimes led to their ‘mutualisation’. For instance, since the 
early 1990s the deregulation of european agricultural markets has led to the conversion of some marketing 
boards to farmer-obs (Milk Mart in the uK is a good example). In the current recession, the low level of 
trust that citizens have in Iobs is not matched by a corresponding faith in public regulation; the failure of 
banks and of regulation are seen to be part of the same shameful episode, and so it is likely that member 
ownership will come to be seen as an alternative to both market failure and regulation.  
4.2. Advantages derived from control
While ownership is a category – one is or is not an owner – control is a variable, in that there can be 
more or less control by members. It is sometimes assumed that the larger the co-operative the less members 
are able to be in control. However, the relationship between size and democracy is a complex one. Clearly, 
in all but the smallest businesses members cannot expect to be in full control as they cede most decisions 
to a board of directors who then delegate some discretion to managers. The larger the co-operative the 
more formalised the control mechanisms have to be, but this also means that member governance becomes 
professionalised (see birchall and simmons 2004a). 
by member control we mean enough of a curb on directorial and managerial authority to ensure that 
the business is run mainly in the interests of members and under their ultimate direction. There are at least 
five advantages that members gain from keeping this kind of control over their Mob. 
1. It guarantees that the benefits from ownership will be realised.
2. It aligns the interests of members with those of boards and managers, and so is linked to business 
success.
3. It lowers risk-taking and so makes the business more durable.
4. It increases opportunities to pursue ethical aims as well as shareholder value.
5. It has intrinsic value to members; they may enjoy taking part and having a sense of control. 
In theory, the advantages that are derived from ownership are intrinsic; they apply even if the members 
do not control Mobs. This means that there are advantages to member ownership even if there are failings 
in governance. This argument was put in relation to uK building societies when they were threatened 
with demutualisation. In the rather protected market that building societies were in before deregulation 
in 1986, members had been minimally involved but had benefitted from a system that recycled credit 
to house purchasers at low cost and low risk, with nobody taking profits. Demutualisation meant that a 
different set of owners would take the profits in the future. This argument is even stronger in relation to 
mutual life insurers, whose with-profits policyholders do not have to compete with investors for the profits. 
When converted, they have had problems in allocating the residual assets, and have had to be more strictly 
regulated so that with-profits pension holders are protected (Mabbett 2001). 
However, these intrinsic advantages are not guaranteed for long if boards take decisions that are not 
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in the interests of members. For instance, in the late 1980s equitable Life gave guarantees to one type of 
customer-member that virtually bankrupted it over the next two decades. The first advantage of member 
control is, then, that it guarantees the advantages that are derived from member-ownership. Furthermore, 
there is strong evidence that effective member control is linked to business success. In a study of several 
hundred agricultural co-operatives in India, shah found that success could be explained not in relation 
to the environment the co-operatives were working in, but more directly in relation to governance. His 
alternative theory is that there are three conditions for success: the purposes of the organisation are central 
to the members; the governance structure ensures patronage cohesiveness; and the operating system finds 
competitive advantage in the relationship with members. to achieve these conditions the members have to 
be in control of governance (shah 1996). 
another way of understanding the advantages gained from member control is in terms of risk and 
opportunity. The more members are involved in governance the more likely it is that the organisation will 
avoid excessive risk-taking. During the recent banking crisis, co-operative banks and credit unions were 
recognised to be much less risky than investor-owned banks, and since then they have been increasing 
their market share (birchall 2013b). In recessions, worker co-operatives have a good track record in using 
their power to choose between alternative investment policies to protect jobs (birchall and Hammond 
Ketilson 2009). Contrast the Canadian farmer co-operative, saskatchewan Wheat Pool, which got into 
serious difficulties in the late 1990s due to risky takeovers and expansions that were not sanctioned by the 
members (Fulton and Larson 2009). 
More positively, the involvement of members creates opportunities for them to pursue other aims than 
just business success. They can express ethical aims in the way the business is run. For instance, the uK 
Co-operative bank has been a market leader in ethical trading, being the first bank to offer free current 
accounts, pledging that it will not lend to companies its customers regard as unethical, and so on. one 
reason it has been able to do this is because, as a wholly owned subsidiary of the Co-operative group, it 
has had a supportive board that during the 1980s and 1990s was prepared for it not to make much profit 
(birchall 2005). of course, other types of business also pursue ethical aims; it would be a caricature to 
say that Iobs only care about shareholder value. It is just that the Mob seems particularly suited to the 
expression of ethical concerns through doing business. 
Finally, there is some intrinsic satisfaction in being in control of a business that is run for one’s own 
benefit, and for the benefit of others who are in similar circumstances. In a study of area committee 
members of the Co-operative group (carried out by this author with a grant from the economic and social 
research Council), both individual and collective motivations to participate were measured. one of the 
most important individual motivations was a sense of being in control (birchall and simmons 2004a and 
b). This is particularly important in employee ownership; the chance to control the production process is 
one of the reasons people choose to set up worker co-operatives. This argument should not, however, be 
taken too far. studies of the Mondragon co-operative system in spain have disagreed over the extent to 
which workers feel they are in control and see this as an advantage (Mathews 2001). Hansmann goes even 
further and suggests that a lack of direct control can be an advantage as it cuts down the costs of governance 
(1996 ch.6). Certainly, in larger worker-owned businesses co-ordination mechanisms are necessary that are 
more formalised, and give more control to managers and directors. They balance the desire for member 
control against the need for improved co-ordination of production and reduce conflict between individuals 
and groups within the co-operative. 
In the current recession it is likely that member control of Mobs will increase, for two reasons. First, 
The potential of co-operatives during the current recession; theorizing comparative advantage
Birchall, J.
13
JEOD - Vol.2, Issue 1 (2013)
there is a new interest in finding alternatives to discredited Iobs, especially in banking but also in other 
sectors. The pool of members willing to become activists will increase in size. second, the recession has 
coincided with the development of the Internet and social media. This means that the costs of collaboration 
by members of Mobs and by groups sympathetic to this way of doing business have collapsed. We can 
expect increased member participation, both in Internet-based and face-to-face interactions (birchall, 
Mitchell and smith et al. 2012). already the benefits of the Internet are being harnessed to the member-
owned business model by leading co-operatives such as the Co-operative group in the uK and the 
Mondragon Corporation in spain.  
4.3. Advantages derived from benefits
The advantages to be gained by members sharing in the benefits of Mobs are not difficult to understand; 
together they can channel the value added from the business to themselves rather than to investor-owners 
or to ‘middlemen’. Consumer obs and producer obs on the supply side of the value chain provide goods 
at the lowest possible price to their members. They operate a kind of cost-price mechanism, first charging 
members a market price for their goods and then, after each trading period, calculating a patronage refund 
(known in uK consumer co-ops as the ‘dividend’) that returns to them any surplus that has been made. 
Producer obs on the marketing side operate a similar system, with a two-stage payment system for goods 
delivered to them by members for selling on. They also operate a refund system for profits made at other 
stages of the value chain such as food processing. Worker obs provide their members with wages set by 
the labour market, and then distribute profits in various ways, including cash bonuses or non-voting 
preference shares.  
These kinds of benefits are particularly important where members are poor; the extra income gained 
can raise them out of poverty. Increased incomes then have knock-on effects on other aspects of their lives 
such as improved maternal health and increased school attendance (birchall 2004). This partly explains 
why, during the post-colonial period in developing countries, co-operatives received so much support from 
international development agencies (birchall and simmons 2010). 
5. Advantages of MOBs to wider society
so far we have been identifying the advantages to members, but there are wider advantages to society 
in general from having an Mob sector. The most obvious one is the diversity that different types of 
ownership bring to a market sector.  Hannan and Freeman say: 
the ability of society as a whole to respond to changing conditions depends on the responsiveness of its constituent 
organisations and on the diversity of its organisational populations  (1989:3). 
Diversity is important because it affects the capacity of a society to respond to uncertain future changes; 
this is of particular importance during the current recession, whose consequences are hard to predict. 
Mobs are a ‘repository of alternative solutions to the problem of producing sets of collective outcomes’ 
(Hannan and Freeman 1989:7). (There are other ways of responding to a rapidly changing environment. 
businesses can be reorganised but, because of inertia and the ability of existing coalitions of interest to block 
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change, this will be costly and may not even be possible. new organisations can be created to deal with 
new problems, but start-ups are always fragile and have a much higher risk of failure than do established 
businesses. If we see the global economy as a kind of evolutionary, adaptive system then we can expect one 
type of business to thrive at the expense of another. However, if one type dies out completely then the stock 
of existing solutions will have declined. This almost happened with the uK building societies in the 1990s, 
but around 30% of the sector survived and is now showing that it has some inherent advantages over Iobs; 
mutuals are more risk-averse and so more trusted by consumers for relatively simple transactions such 
as residential mortgages and savings, and they have built-in advantages from not having to remunerate 
a separate group of shareholders (Llewellyn and Drake 2001). They have been lightly touched by the 
banking crisis, and so their survival is good for the financial system as a whole.  
The current banking crisis points up further evidence of the sector’s importance. The massive public 
bail-out of private, investor-owned banks has underlined the virtues of a customer-owned co-operative 
banking system that is more risk-averse and less driven by the need to make profits for investors and 
bonuses for managers. Credit unions and co-operative banks all over the world are reporting that they are 
still financially sound, and that customers are flocking to bank with them because they are highly trusted. 
The point is an important one, because the co-operative banking sector is extraordinarily large; the market 
penetration of credit unions worldwide is 7.7% but in north america it has reached 44.1%, while the 
european co-operative banks have a market share of 21% of deposits and 19% of loans (birchall 2010: 
147-150, 2013b).
another crisis that has pointed up the advantages of Mobs is the recent increase in food and energy 
prices that will impact most severely on the world’s poorest people. The World bank estimates that food 
demand will double by 2030 as the world’s population increases by another two billion people. There is an 
urgent need for developing countries to increase the output of food yet the rural economy has been badly 
neglected (World bank 2008). one answer is to encourage farmers to mobilise collectively in associations 
that organise the supply, processing and marketing of crops and give them access to markets; only in this 
way will they be able to increase the quantity and quality of outputs. Farmer-owned businesses are growing 
in most developing countries, but they need a lot more financial help and technical support if they are to 
reach their potential. India’s dairy co-ops illustrate what can happen when a concerted effort is made over a 
long period of time: here, 100,000 dairy co-ops collect 16.5 million litres of milk from 12 million farmer 
members every day, making a massive contribution to India’s food supply (oCDC 2007).  
Mobs are also relevant to the informalisation of economies in the megacities of the less economically 
developed countries, where the problem is no longer one of economic exploitation by colonial powers but 
of indifference – one might say that they have been bypassed by the global system; the recession can only 
make this situation worse. a majority of people in the megacities now find work only in an unregulated 
informal economy characterised by underemployment and poor wages. one way they can begin to 
participate in the global economy and find decent work is through association, in credit co-ops that lend 
them money to start small businesses and shared service co-ops that support them in self-employment 
(smith and ross 2006). 
along with these crises is the prospect of the Millennium Development goals not being met at their 
target date of 2015 (the recession and continuing debt crisis in europe will not help as they divert attention 
and funding back towards the developed countries). There are good reasons for thinking that Mobs have 
in-built advantages in poverty reduction. The World bank has identified three elements in an anti-poverty 
strategy: opportunity, empowerment and security. because Mobs are economic associations, they provide 
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the opportunity for poor people to raise their incomes. because they are democracies with each member 
having one vote, they empower people to own their own solutions, and because they pool risks at the level 
of the enterprise and offer micro-insurance they increase security (birchall 2003: ch.2). also, there is now 
a great deal of evidence to show that they not only raise incomes but contribute directly to meeting several 
of the other Millennium Development goals (birchall 2004: ch.4; birchall and simmons 2009). 
6. Disadvantages of MOBs
These are just some of the arguments that have been made for the advantages of Mobs to wider society, 
and some of them have particular salience during a recession and global debt crisis. However, they rely on 
Mobs being able to realise their potential, and also relate to the comparative advantages of other types of 
business organisation, which also may or may not be realised. There may be disadvantages of Mobs that 
outweigh the advantages, and these will be considered next, again in relation to the three key elements of 
ownership, control and benefit.
6.1. Disadvantages derived from diluted ownership
Mobs tend to be owned by large numbers of people, each having a small, often nominal shareholding. 
traditionally, co-operatives have set the shareholding at a low level so as to encourage poorer people to 
join. They have not rewarded this shareholding with anything other than a nominal interest rate, and when 
they leave members receive par value for it. sometimes, in order to raise more capital they offer loan stock 
(also known as preferred shares or b stock) that does not carry voting rights and is rewarded with fixed 
interest. This is all according to co-operative principles that have been carefully drawn so as to emphasise 
the primacy of users over investors (birchall 1997: ch.7). as a result they face five problems:
1. Members are reluctant to subscribe more capital and so the Mob has to raise money through building 
up reserves or borrowing from banks. 
2. Members only have weak financial incentives to take part in governance.
3. The low level of member investment can lead to lack of loyalty to the business.
4. If the reserves become larger than they need to be to finance the business strategy, or if the potential 
value of the business in the shares market is much higher than the realisable value to the members, 
they will have an incentive to unlock the potential value by converting to investor-ownership or selling 
the business. 
5. If the business is doing badly, members have an incentive to use the reserves built up over generations 
to keep it going. They may be tempted to delay taking more painful decisions about the restructuring 
of the business. 
There are steps that Mob directors can take to minimise these disadvantages. They can set the initial 
member share at a higher level and, if members cannot afford it, can offer payment in instalments. This 
is how the rochdale Pioneers began in 1844, with a one-pound share that was expensive at the time 
but has not been revalued since. However, consumer co-ops remain disadvantaged by being non-mutual 
– customers do not need to become members. only in Japan, where mutuality is enforced by law, do 
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customers have to buy a membership share, and here the cost is high – around £40 compared to the £1 
charged in the uK. 
Producer obs are in a stronger position. They can distribute reserves to members in proportion to 
their use of the business by issuing preference shares, as some farmer co-ops are doing. They can insist 
that members buy more of these shares in proportion to their use of the business. For instance, arla Foods 
(owned by swedish and Danish farmers), in doing business with scottish farmers, is tying them into the 
business through compulsory share purchases funded through a proportion of the milk payment (birchall 
2009). Producer obs can issue new shares with extra voting rights attached, revalue shares annually 
according to some index of company value, or create internal share markets in which members can buy 
and sell to each other. Many farmer co-ops and employee-owned businesses are taking these steps, while 
some are creating companies on the stock market in which members can sell shares to outside investors, 
so that the Mob becomes a hybrid of a member-owned holding company and an investor-owned trading 
company (Chaddad and Cook 2004).   
This aligning of company value with member shareholdings can cause its own problems. It has to be 
carefully managed to avoid sudden calls on capital when members retire from the business, and both farmer 
co-ops and worker co-ops are evolving rules that allow the process to be carefully managed. employee-
owned businesses that are majority worker-owned do not have this problem, as they allow workers to own 
as many shares as they like alongside outside investors in a free market. some farmer obs and retailer-obs 
have also become Iobs but with members in a majority, and they also avoid this problem of restricted 
ownership, but at a danger of dilution of the advantages of being member-controlled.
6.2. Disadvantages derived from lack of control by members
a lack of member control may ultimately lead to the Mob becoming effectively non-owned. They can 
be captured by their managers or by their boards (or a combination of the two). These interest groups may 
then extract more than their fair share of the profits in salaries, bonuses, and perks, may take the opportunity 
to make life easier for themselves by working less hard, and so on. The result is lower organisational 
efficiency, higher prices for consumers and, in worker co-ops, lower salaries and bonuses for the workers. 
economists sometimes take a pessimistic approach that predicts that members will not participate, 
and so Mobs can be expected to fail. There is a well-known ‘paradox of participation’ that proposes that 
rational actors will not participate in collective action to achieve common goals (olson 1965), but will 
‘free ride’. This paradox would apply to Mobs in a severe way, if not for empirical evidence that refutes 
the theory (it is better at predicting abstention than participation), and for theoretical developments that 
suggest that a much broader range of motivations affect members’ decision whether or not to participate 
(birchall, Mitchell and smith 2012). a ‘mutual incentives’ theory developed by this author has been 
tested in consumer and housing co-operatives. It provides some evidence that suggests that members of 
Mobs are motivated by a range of individual and collective incentives, and that activists who compete 
for places in the governance structure place a high value on a sense of community, shared goals and shared 
values as well as on individualistic benefits (birchall and simmons 2004a). nonetheless, there are plenty of 
examples of governance failures brought on by lack of member involvement. However, these point more 
to the lack of member education (and sometimes to a deliberate strategy among board members to deny 
members a say) than to a fundamental problem of motivation. Control by members may never become 
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a mass participation activity. Yet the conditions for effective control by members are not onerous; they 
demand merely that a small proportion of members interest themselves regularly in the governance of the 
business, a larger proportion intermittently, and a majority of members when things go wrong (birchall 
and simmons 2001). 
6.3. Disadvantages derived from lack of benefits to members 
under conditions of market failure the advantages of Mobs to their members tend to be obvious. 
However, if governments step in to regulate markets, or if markets that were failing have become more free 
(sometimes as a consequence of the action of Mobs, sometimes as a policy of economic liberalisation) then 
it will be difficult for Mobs to justify their existence against Iobs. This is what has happened to consumer 
co-operatives in europe, which by the 1980s had lost much of their rationale (though in the uK they have 
to some extent reinvented themselves as champions of fair trade, bringing back a ‘dividend’ to members, 
and so on). Producer co-operatives have not suffered the drastic loss of purpose that occurred in consumer 
co-ops, but there has been a loosening of loyalty, with primary co-ops in many countries (as diverse as 
Canada and tanzania) making alliances with private companies rather than staying with their traditional 
federal structures (birchall 2010: ch.8). similarly, in worker co-ops such as Mondragon there has been a 
pragmatic acceptance of the need to expand way beyond national borders if the benefits to members are 
to be protected. This has raised important questions concerning the ethics of a worker-controlled system 
‘exploiting’ the labour of non-member employees in other countries (MacLeod and reed 2009). 
7. The comparative nature of advantage and disadvantage
advantages and disadvantages can be identified through theory and historical examples but they are 
always relative to the advantages and disadvantages of other types of ownership. In a relatively open market 
they translate into competitive advantage, but it all depends on what the competition is like. Here are four 
scenarios:
a. there is no competition so the Mob survives even if it is not very well run;
b. there is some competition but the Mob is strong enough to see it off (having got there first);
c. there is strong competition but the market is relatively open and a Mob sector holds its own;
d. there is intense competition and the Mob sector loses market share even though it has advantages;
In the current recession, competition may well increase, and so scenarios b, c and d are likely to apply. 
sometimes governments have been put under pressure by the Mobs’ competitors, and have discriminated 
against the Mob sector; the history of american fraternal societies is a good example (beito 1990). again, 
under the stresses of a long recession this kind of attack on member-ownership may be seen again. 
Do other business types have advantages Mobs cannot match? Iobs have the ability to raise capital 
on the money markets through share issues. They can also incentivise managers and align their interests 
better with those of the business through bonus shares. The threat of takeover is a powerful incentive 
to good management that Mobs tend to avoid (when Mobs get into trouble they tend to merge with 
other Mobs). but there are big problems with Iobs because of their short-termism and need to reward 
The potential of co-operatives during the current recession; theorizing comparative advantage
Birchall, J.
18
JEOD - Vol.2, Issue 1 (2013)
shareholders and managers. These result in governance failure, risk-taking, disinvestment and all the 
problems of modern capitalism that have been starkly evidenced in the banking crisis of 2008. a few years 
ago, critics of the co-operative model were able to argue that these significant advantages of capitalism 
would lead to conversions and that there was now only ‘one game in town’. now, the advantages are seen 
as liabilities and the co-operative model is being examined more closely. 
8. Will the potential be realised?
a theoretical understanding of the advantages and disadvantages only identifies potentials. Whether 
these will be realised depends on a combination of good leadership, effective management and good 
member relations. Here are a few signs of renewal that I have observed. 
a. There is a growing commitment to value-based leadership and management among existing member-
owned businesses (e.g. us farmer-owned agri-businesses, consumer co-ops in uK, spain and Italy).
b. new ways are being found to connect up a large membership to the business, using the internet 
(Co-operative group and Midcounties Co-op in the uK are leaders). a real co-operative culture is 
emerging.
c. In agriculture, new types of collaboration with Iobs are creating hybrid forms of business ownership 
without co-op members losing control of the core business. 
d. The problem of how to trade transnationally is being solved by taking customers in other countries 
into membership (e.g. arla Foods in Finland and uK, eroski Co-op in spain and France).
e. Co-operative banks in europe and credit unions in north america are being seen as a stabilising 
influence on the banking system.
one prediction that can be made with confidence is that the co-operative business model will get a great 
deal of attention. some critics of the current crisis are beginning to recognise that if the potential of Mobs 
were realized we would quickly come to a new world economic order that is more stable, more trustworthy, 
more equitable, and driven not by profit but by the desire to meet people’s needs. It would be a ‘people-
centred’ rather than a money-centred economy. behavioural scientists are demonstrating that it would not 
need a new form of human nature to emerge; it is in line with what we know about the human capacity to 
co-operate, based on ‘strong reciprocity’ (Fehr et al. 2003; bowles and gintis 2011; birchall, Mitchell and 
smith 2012). However, it is still all about survival in an ecology of competing business types. We cannot 
make the utopia happen just by envisaging it. Yet it is not just the co-operative itself, but the idea of co-
operatives that is significant. The idea gives people something to hope for, to strive to bring into being – it 
creates a hopeful attitude. More than this, it provides a counter-narrative to global capitalism that anti-
capitalists need if they are to succeed in turning a reactive movement into something more proactive. In 
this sense, there is already a co-operative alternative to capitalism. 
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